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SOME PROBLEMS OF PRESUMPTIONS:
THE SOUTH CAROLINA TREATMENT
Due to the number and extent of the various presumptions
a definitive work on the subject would be monumental. There-
fore this note will be limited to three of the major problems
in this area.
1st-What is a presumption? This question is not merely
a problem in semantics but has arisen due to the loose lan-
guage employed by the bench and the bar in describing and
categorizing presumptions.
2nd-What effect does a presumption have if no evidence
is introduced and what effect does the presumption have if
rebutting evidence is introduced? In considering this prob-
lem we shall examine the rules adopted by the Supreme Court
of South Carolina as well as those of other jurisdictions.
3rd-What, if anything, should the judge tell the jury about
presumptions? This problem is an important one because it
is the end product or result of the presumption. The South
Carolina practice will be contrasted with the views of the
text writers and of other jurisdictions.
What is a Presumption
A presumption, as defined by Professor McCormick, is a
standardized practice, under which certain oft-recurring fact
groupings are held to call for uniform treatment whenever
they occur, with respect to their effect as proof to support
issues.1 A presumption is distinguished from an inference in
that a presumption is the deduction which the law expressly
directs or permits to be made from particular facts, while an
inference is a deduction which may be made from any facts
legally proved.
2
Because of the variety of situations which give rise to
presumptions many attempts have been made to break the
word down into sub-classifications. One of the more common
classifications used in South Carolina as elsewhere was that
of presumption of law and presumption of fact.3 Judge Wha-
ley in his work4 states the difference between the two as
1. 5 N.C.L. REv. 291 (1927).
2. 1 JONES, EVIDENCE 54-55 (2d ed. 1926).
3. MeMillan v. General Am. Life Ins. Co. 194 S.C. 146, 9 S.E.2d 562
(1940); Lawrence v. So. Ry. 169 S.C. 1, 167 S.E. 839 (1932).
4. WHALEY, SOUTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE 162 (9 S.C.L.Q. 4A, 1957).
538
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being that a presumption of fact is rebuttable while a pre-
sumption of law is irrebuttable. It is submitted that this
distinction is unsound and adds unnecessary confusion, If a
presumption is truly irrebuttable, such as a presumption of a
lost grant5 or the presumption that one intends the natural
consequences of his acts, 6 then this is a rule of law and not
a presumption at all. It is a rule of law in South Carolina that
a child under the age of seven years cannot be guilty of con-
tributory negligence7 Further there is a presumption that a
child between the ages of seven and fourteen years is incapable
of contributory negligence but this may be rebutted.s To
call the former a presumption of law and the latter a pre-
sumption of fact appears to be clearly wrong. While both
could be classified as presumptions under Professor McCor-
mick's definition it is submitted that a presumption operates
so that in certain situations detailed proof of the conclusion
to be drawn is not required if the conclusion itself is not con-
troverted by the opposing party. But if the judge will not
allow evidence to be introduced to show that the conclusion
is incorrect then the rule is an absolute one and the use of
the term presumption is unnecessary.
The term presumption of fact is more commonly used to
refer either to an inference9 or to a presumption that is in-
dulged in because of the probability of the presumed fact.10
For the sake of clarity the term should not be used as a syn-
onym for an inference as it is confusing when so used."'
5. Miller v. Cramer, 48 S.C. 282, 26 S.E. 657 (1896); Riddlehoover v.
Kinard, 1 Hill Eq. (S.C.) 373 (1833).
6. So. Silica Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Hoefer, 215 S.C. 480, 56 S.E.2d 321
(1949) ; Rice v. City of Columbia, 143 S.C. 516, 141 S.E. 705 (1926).
7. Sexton v. Noll Constr. Co., 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129 (1916); Dodd
v. Spartanburg Ry., 95 S.C. 9, 78 S.E. 525 (1913).
8. Cummings v. Lawrence, 87 S.C. 457, 69 S.E. 1090 (1910); Goodwin
v. Columbia Mills Co., 80 S.C. 349, 61 S.E. 390 (1908).
9. State v. Goodson, 225 S.C. 418, 82 S.E.2d 804 (1954); Collins v.
Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 210 S.C. 207, 42 S.E.2d 67 (1947).
10. Strawhorne v. Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 40, 119 S.E.2d
101 (1961); Lawrence v. Southern Ry., 169 S.C. 1, 167 S.E. 839 (1932).
11. An example of the confusion that might arise is found in the cases
involving the suppression or withholding of evidence. The following cases
hold that the suppression of witnesses or the withholding of data gives
rise to an inference that such information would have been unfavorable
to the person withholding the information. Davis v. Sparks, 235 S.C. 326,
111 S.E.2d 545 (1959); Wingate v. Postal Tel. & Cable Co., 204 S.C. 520,
30 S.E.2d 307 (1944); Cato v. Atlanta & C.A.L. Ry., 164 S.C. 123, 162
S.E. 239 (1931). However, Matthews v. National Fid. Ins. Co., 228 S.C.
124, 89 S.E.2d 95 (1955) 4nd Collins v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 210
S.C. 207, 42 S.E.2d 67 (1947) hold that such suppression or withholding
of evidence gives rise to the presumption that such testimony if presented
would be unfavorable to the person withholding such information.
2
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Since presumptions based on probability have the same effect
as rebuttable presumptions of law, the term "presumption of
fact" is also unnecessary in the latter situation. Moreover
many presumptions which are based partly on probability and
partly on other grounds such as procedural convenience would
defy classification and would produce unnecessary confusion.
An interesting question which is productive of much con-
fusion in this area is when do certain facts give rise to an
inference and when do the same fact groupings evolve into a
presumption. In the case of Tate v. Mauldin]2 the Court
quoting Professor McCormick states, "This general principle
that a prior or subsequent existence is evidential of a later
or earlier one has been repeatedly laid down, and has even
been spoken of as a presumption." 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
772. It appears that where a certain fact grouping has been
decided the same way a number of times but has never been
declared a presumption in the jurisdiction now faced with the
problem, the trial judge has the discretion to declare that the
fact grouping gives rise either to a presumption or merely
that an inference may be drawn from the facts and that his
decision will be reviewable only for an abuse of discretion.' 3
As a general rule it may be seen that it is the trial judge and
not the appellate court who initially establishes the presump-
tion in the particular jurisdiction.
Discarding then the presumption of fact and presumption
of law classifications we are now faced with the problem of
permissive and mandatory presumptions. Professor McCor-
mick defines permissive presumptions as those which give
the jury the permission to infer the offered conclusion while
mandatory presumptions are those in which the jury is com-
pelled to find in favor of the conclusion in the absence of
proof to the contrary.14 Although the distinction may be
readily seen, it is seldom mentioned in the cases since seldom
does the opponent fail to offer any proof of his case. More-
over, Thayer, 15 Wigmore,'0 ' and the American Law Institute"'
12. 157 S.C. 392, 152 S.E. 431 (1930).
13. See Tate v. Mauldin, 157 S.C. 392, 152 S.E. 431 (1930) at page 404.
14. 5 N.C.L. REV. 291, 295 (1927).
15. THAYER, PRELIIINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 317-326 (1898).
16. 9 WIGMioRE, EVIDENCE § 2490 (1940).
17. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 13 (1954) which states, "A presumnp-
tion is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires
such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts found or
otherwise established in the action."
[Vol. 14
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would abandon the term "permissive presumption" and say
that only presumptions which have the compulsory effect are
true presumptions. The Thayer-Wigmore rule is clearly the
better rule since it is a more scientific approach and it pro-
duces a uniform result. Unfortunately, however, the denial
of the existence of the permissive presumption does not coin-
cide with actual judicial usage.
While the South Carolina Supreme Court has never recog-
nized the permissive presumption as such the Court in the
case of McBride v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,18 at page 274,
in speaking of the presumption that the failure to give the
proper signals at a railroad crossing is the proximate cause of
the injury says, "The presumption merely establishes a prima
facie case, which may be overcome by testimony, whether
given for the plaintiff or for the defendant."'19 The Court has
defined prima facie evidence as that evidence which is suf-
ficient in law to establish the fact unless rebutted.20 How-
ever, it is now established that a prima facie case means that
the evidence is sufficient to justify, but not to compel, an
inference of liability and furnishes evidence to be weighed,
but not necessarily to be accepted by the jury or trier of fact.
21
South Carolina, therefore, appears to recognize that there are
presumptions which standing alone, and where no rebutting
evidence has been offered, the jury could properly find for the
opponent of the presumption.
The problem is largely academic. It is the rare case in
which the opposing party will offer no evidence and, as we
shall see, if evidence is offered by the opponent the permissive
presumption, with one distinguishing feature, will be handled
in the same manner as the mandatory presumption. It must
be borne in mind that the permissive presumption is a true
presumption and not an inference since it performs the major
task of a presumption, that is that the opponent will be unable
to successfully demur to the case presented.
It would be difficult if not impossible to set out which
presumptions are permissive and which are mandatory. Suf-
18. 140 S.C. 260, 138 S.E. 803 (1927).
19. See also Tate v. Mauldin, 157 S.C. 392, 152 S.E. 431 (1930).
20. La Count v. General Asbestos & Rubber Co., 184 S.C. 232, 240, 192
S.E. 262 (1937).
21. Vance v. Guy, 224 N.C. 607, 31 S.E.2d 766 (1944); Roosa v. Wick-
ward, 90 Ohio App. 213, 105 N.E.2d 454 (1950); McCoy v. Courtney, 25
Wash.2d 956, 172 P.2d 596 (1946).
1962]
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fice it to say that one who is likely to be faced with this
situation should closely scrutinize the judicial pronouncements
of the presumption to determine what relative weight the
court is likely to give to it. Therefore we should recognize,
at least academically, that there are two types of presump-
tions, permissive and mandatory. These will be lumped to-
gether and referred to collectively as presumptions for the
balance of this note.
It would be proper at this point to state parenthetically
that presumptions are not evidence and are not to be weighed
as such. The roots of this misconception are found in the
early case of Joyner v. South Carolina Ry.22 wherein the Court,
quoting from Greenleaf on Evidence states, "The legal pre-
sumption is to be regarded by the jury as a matter of evidence,
to the benefit of which the party is entitled." In a later case2 3
the Court seems to infer that the presumption is evidence
when Mr. Justice Woods wrote ". . . the jury can not rest
their verdict on the presumption alone, but must consider, not
only the presumption, but all the evidence on the subject, and
rest their verdict on the preponderance of the entire evidence."
In Baker v. Western Union Tel. Co.24 the Court says, ".... it
was proper for the jury to weigh the evidence of diligence
against the presumption of negligence from long delay."
This misconception was finally cleared up in MeMillan v.
General Am. Life Ins. Co.,2 5 wherein the Court, in considering
the presumption against suicide stated:
It cannot be held that these cases cited by plaintiff are
authority for the proposition that the assumption (sic)
against suicide has the force and effect of evidence,...
If there be such holding in any of these cases, or other
decisions of this Court, they are overruled.
At page 174 the Court says, "We think it was error for the
trial judge to charge that such presumption has the weight
and effect of evidence. '26
22. 26 S.C. 49, 1 S.E. 52 (1886).
23. Griffith & Bro. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 82 S.C. 252, 255, 64 S.E.
222 (1908).
24. 87 S.C. 174, 178, 69 S.E. 151 (1910).
25. 194 S.C. 146, 173, 9 S.E.2d 562 (1940).
26. The McMillan decision brings South Carolina in line with the
majority view that the presumption is not evidence and is not to be
considered as such. See 95 A.L.R. 878 (1935), 103 A.L.R. 185 (1936),
115 A.L.R. 404 (1938) and 31 CJ.S. Evidence § 119 (1942).
542 [Vol. 14
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Effect of Presumptions
The next problem to be considered is what effect is there
on the presumption when rebutting evidence is introduced.
As we have seen, where no rebutting evidence is offered, the
distinction between mandatory and permissive presumptions
becomes critical. This distinction is of less importance in the
normal situation where the opponent offers evidence to rebut
the presumption.
To clearly understand the effect of rebutting evidence on
presumptions we must analyze the mechanics of the presump-
tion. Each presumption consists of certain basic facts (Fact
A), which, if believed by the jury, give rise to the presumed
fact (Fact B). For example the mailing of a letter properly
addressed gives rise to the presumption that the letter was
received.27 If, however, the jury fails to believe that the
proponent of the presumption ever mailed the letter then
the presumption fails. Here the presumption has been over-
thrown, or to use a more descriptive phrase, the presumption
has been undermined in that the basic fact on which the
presumed fact rested has been removed.28 In this case the
court could quite properly award a non-suit or direct a verdict
for the opponent even though the presumption be manda-
tory.2 19 If the jury believes the basic fact then they must find
the presumed fact. With regards to the permissive presump-
tion, the jury can believe the basic fact that gives rise to the
presumption and still find for the proponent. If, however,
the jury accepts the presumed fact then the permissive pre-
sumption will be handled in the same manner as the manda-
tory presumption.
The more difficult problem comes where the basic fact is
not controverted but the presumed fact is in dispute. It is
well to note at this point that where both the basic fact and
the presumed fact are in dispute that this is merely a combi-
nation of the two problems which must be divided and exam-
ined independently. In this instance the jury must first
determine if the basic fact is more probable than not. If it
27. Keller v. Provident Life & Ace. Co. 213 S.C. 339, 49 S.E.2d 577
(1948); Calder v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 182 S.C. 240, 188 S.E. 864
(1936).
28. 68 U. Pa. L. REv. 307, 312 (1920).
29. Long v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 228 S.C. 498, 90 S.E.2d 915
(1956) ; Craig v. Clearwater Mfg. Co., 189 S.C. 176, 200 S.E. 765 (1938);
Baker v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 S.C. 174, 176, 69 S.E. 151 (1910).
1962]
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss4/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
is not then the presumption will fall. If the basic fact is
accepted then the problem is of the latter class.
If the presumed fact is controverted there are at least five
possible courses of action, of which there is some authority for
at least three in South Carolina. The varying rules are 1)
The presumption disappears and the basic facts remain as
evidence throughout the trial. 2) The presumption disappears
if substantial evidence is offered by the opponent. 3) The
presumption acts to shift the burden of persuasion from the
proponent 30 of the presumption to the opponent on that par-
ticular issue. 4) The presumption remains until the opponent
offers enough countervailing evidence that the factfinder is
persuaded that the balance of probabilities is in equilibrium.
Note that under this rule the balance of persuasion does not
shift from one party to the other. 5) Whether the presump-
tion disappears or remains depends upon the strength of the
presumption.
The first rule, the so called Thayer rule, has resulted in
presumptions being described as bats of the law that flitter
about in the twilight but disappear in the sunshine of actual
facts.31 This is probably the prevailing rule in South Carolina.
In a recent case3 2 the Court stated:
It is true that where death by violent injury has occurred,
unexplained, there is a presumption against suicide, but
this is a presumption of law and not of fact. Where
evidence as to the fact of suicide is introduced, the pre-
sumption against suicide vanishes and the question must
be resolved on the evidence.
In comprehending the results of this holding it is necessary
to examine the question of burden of proof. The burden of
proof is made up of the burden of producing evidence and the
burden of persuasion. This analysis is now accepted by all
30. It should be noted that where the burden of persuasion is on the
opponent of the presumption that it is unnecessary for the presumption
to attempt to shift the burden of persuasion. For example, where the
defendant in a trial has the benefit of a presumption it is unnecessary to
attempt to shift the burden of persuasion on this issue to the plaintiff,
since the plaintiff already has this burden. As one writer has described
it, this would be an attempt to cover with a handkerchief that which is
already covered with a blanket.
31. Mockowik v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. RR., 196 Mo. 550, 94 S.W.
256, 262 (1906).
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courts, so much so that its reiteration is almost trite. Its
recognition by legal scholars, however, was a landmark of
legal analysis and it has had its effect on many diverse fields
of the law.
When the analysis was recognized, many courts accepted
it and distinguished between the two by saying that the bur-
den of producing evidence shifted continuously during the
trial but that the burden of persuasion never shifted. Some
courts have since fallen back from this position but tradition
dies hard and many courts still steadfastedly refuse to retreat
from their original position. South Carolina appears to be one
of these. Under the South Carolina view as found in many of
the cases, presumptions affect the burden of producing evi-
dence but the proponent still has the burden of persuasion.
The most positive statement of this view is found in the case
of Long v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.33 In this case the plain-
tiff was suing to enforce a double indemnity clause for
accidental death of her husband. The Court stated at page
510:
.. that although at the onset proof of death by violent
injury, without more may have sufficed to shift to the
Respondent the burden of offering credible evidence to
the contrary, nevertheless when such evidence had been
offered the burden of persuasion, as distinguished from
the burden of going forward with the evidence, rested
upon appellant to bring herself within the double indem-
nity provision.
This case appears to be incompatible with many early cases.
In the case of Joyner v. South Carolina Ry.34 the plaintiff's
stock was killed by the defendant's train. The trial judge
charged that where the facts were put in evidence the pre-
sumption of negligence disappeared. The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case for trial holding that where
the plaintiff established ownership and death caused by the
railroad that this was sufficient to create the presumption of
liability and that this created a prima facie case. The Court
referred to the earlier case of Danner v. South Carolina Ry.3 5
and stated:
33. 228 S.C. 498, 90 S.E.2d 915 (1956).
34. 26 S.C. 49, 54, 1 S.E. 52 (1886).
35. 4 Rich. (S.C.) 329 (1851).
19621
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We think that when once this presumption is estab-
lished, it remains of controlling force until the defendant's
evidence overthrows it by showing either due care, un-
avoidable accident or something of that kind, the burden
to show which, the prima facie case of the plaintiff, by
operation of the rule in Danner's case, has thrown upon
the defendant.
This doctrine was followed in several later cases36 and last
appears in the case of McLane v. Reliance Life Ins. Co.
37
In this case the Court quotes with approval 37 C. J. 618:
... where the cause of the insured's death is unexplained
and the circumstances are such that it might have resulted
from accident, homicide, negligence, natural causes, or
suicide the presumption is in favor of death by one of
such other causes and against death by suicide. Therefore
the burden of proving death by suicide is on the de-
fendant.
The latest case in this area is that of Strawhorne v. Atlantic
Coast Life Ins. Co.38 wherein the plaintiff sued to collect on
the insurance policy of his deceased wife. The insurance com-
pany set up suicide as a defense. The jury found for the
plaintiff and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case with instructions to enter judgment for the defendant.
Mr. Justice Taylor speaking for the Court stated:
Where the defense of suicide is interposed by the in-
surer to defeat recovery under a policy of insurance, the
burden is upon the insurer to prove the fact of suicide by
a preponderance of the evidence. It is true that where
death by violent injury has occurred, unexplained, there
is a presumption against suicide, but this is a presump-
tion of law and not of fact. When evidence as to the fact
of suicide is introduced the presumption against suicide
vanishes and the question must be resolved upon the evi-
dence.
The Court appears to state the classical Thayer view that
a presumption disappears upon the production of evidence but
36. Hutto v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 81 S.C. 567, 62 S.E. 835 (1908);
Griffith & Bro. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 82 S.C. 252, 64 S.E. 222
(1908); Sullivan v. Charleston & W.C. Ry., 85 S.C. 532, 67 S.E. 905
1910); Marsh v. Pioneer-Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 174 S.C. 59, 176 S.E.
878 (1984).
37. 192 S.C. 245, 251, 6 S.E.2d 13 (1939).
88. 238 S.C. 40, 43, 119 S.E.2d 101 (1961).
[Vol. 14
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creates the rule that the defense of suicide by the insurer is
an affirmative defense. Therefore the same result is reached
through the burden of persuasion rule that was formerly
achieved by means of a presumption. It should be pointed
out that the Long case and the Strawhorne case may be dis-
tinguished. In the Long case the plaintiff brought the action
to recover on a double indemnity clause and had the burden
of proving death from external, violent and accidental means;
whereas in the Strawhorne case the plaintiff was attempting
to collect on a life insurance policy which contained a non
liability clause for suicide. It is submitted, however, that in
both cases the defendant raised the defense of suicide and
that on this single issue the presumption against suicide
should have operated with equal efficacy.39
Under the Thayer rule the presumption disappears upon the
production of evidence but the basic facts remain as evidence
for whatever value they may have. In the majority of cases
involving presumptions, the basic fact does have some extrinsic
value as evidence and the theory is an acceptable one. For
example, proof of seven years continued and unexplained
absence without tidings raises the presumption of death.40
If the opponent offers in evidence testimony to explain the
absence then the presumption disappears and the jury may
resolve the issue on the evidence. But in cases involving the
presumption against suicide the fact of the insured's death
has no extrinsic value as evidence. In this case the Thayer
rule is unworkable and some expedient must be adopted as
was done in the Strawhorne case or the presumption must be
completely disregarded no matter how minute the amount of
evidence offered to controvert it. This is the most valid
criticism of the pure Thayerian rule. It is unreasonable to
say that a presumption should fail merely because the op-
39. This view is followed in the cases of Downing v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 314 Ill. App. 222, 41 N.E.2d 297 (1941) and Lewis v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 113 Mont. 151, 124 P. 2d 579 (1942). In the case of New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Ganer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938), the United States
Supreme Court in considering a case involving a double indemnity clause
held that where evidence was offered to rebut the presumption against
suicide that the presumption not being evidence could not act to shift the
burden of persuasion. The Court, however, makes no attempt to dif-
ferentiate between a policy involving a double indemnity clause and a
policy containing a non-liability clause for suicide. Therefore while the
case has often been cited as authority for distinguishing the two types
of cases it appears that the Court would reach the same result in both
cases.
40. Dill v. Sovereign Camp W. 0. W., 202 S.C. 401, 25 S.E. 285 (1943);
Duncan v. Duncan, 190 S.C. 211, 2 S.E.2d 388 (1939).
1962]
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss4/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
ponent offers evidence that is not believed by the factfinder
even though such evidence might be credible.
To overcome this objection some courts have adopted the
so called New York rule. Under this rule the presumption
disappears in the face of substantial countervailing evidence
and thereafter the case is in the hands of the jury free of
any presumption. 41 There is some basis for this rule in Wig-
more's work42 but the rule is open to much criticism. In the
first place the meaning of "substantial" is not always clear
and the courts appear to have made no attempt to define it.
Secondly, the rule encroaches on the jury's province as the
finder of fact. Under this theory the judge may consider the
weight of the evidence in each case and upon his determination
of whether the evidence is substantial he will inform the jury
as to whether the presumption stands or whether it has been
overthrown. There does not appear to be any authority for
this rule in South Carolina.
The third possible course of action where the presumed
fact has been controverted is the method espoused by Profes-
sor McCormick. This rule has been widely acclaimed in the
law reviews but has met with strong resistance in the courts.
Under this view the presumption is a working hypothesis
which acts by shifting the burden to the party against whom
it operates of satisfying the jury that the presumed inference
is untrue.43 Here the presumption would act to shift the
burden of persuasion on the particular issue from the pro-
ponent to the opponent. This has the definite advantage of
being easily understood by the jury, and while it may be
criticized as giving more efficacy to the presumption than
that to which it is entitled, it is submitted that this provides
the most suitable solution to the problem yet proposed. While
South Carolina has not adopted this view with regard to all
presumptions, certain presumptions do have this effect. Ex-
amples of this are the presumption against suicide,44 the
41. Pariso v. Towse, 45 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1930); Chaika v. Vandenberg,
252 App. Div. 101, 169 N.E. 103 (1929).
42. 9 WIoMonn, EVDENC § 2491 (1940).
43. 13 WASH. L. REv. 185, 187-192 (1938).
44. Strawhoine v. Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co. 238 S.C. 40, 119 S.E.2d
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presumption of legitimacy 45 and other presumptions based
on public policy.46
An intermediate position is that adopted by the Maine court
in the case of Hinds v. John Hancock Ins. Co.47 In this case
which involved a suit to recover double indemnity on a policy
of insurance, the court stated that a presumption persists
until the contrary evidence persuades the factfinder that the
balance of probabilities is in equilibrium or stated otherwise,
until the evidence satisfies the jury that it is as probable that
the presumed fact does not exist as that it does exist. Under
this rule if this test is met the presumptions vanish.
The court adopted this rule since there was precedent in
Maine that the burden of persuasion never shifts and the
court did not wish to overrule this precedent. The court was
careful to point out that the presumption was not evidence and
is not to be weighed as such.
The last rule to be considered is that the weight to be given
to any presumption depends upon the reason upon which the
presumption is based. This theory was advanced by Professor
Bohlen in his article, "Rebuttable Presumptions of Law".48
While Professor Bohlen gives only three reasons for the
creation of presumptions it is generally agreed that there are
at least four. They are 1) Probability 2) Procedural Con-
venience 3) Fairness in allocating the burden of first produc-
ing evidence upon the party who has superior means of access
to the proof 4) Certain social and economic policies.49
In his article Professor Bohlen urges that where the fact is
based on probability, for example, the presumption of death
after seven years unexplained absence without tidings, that
such presumption should have the effect of shifting the burden
of persuasion since the presumption is based on data upon
which the ordinary man would not hesitate to act even in his
important personal affairs. Likewise the burden of persuasion
45. Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Manos, 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E.2d 857 (1954);
Russell v. Russell, 118 S.C. 420, 110 S.E. 791 (1921).
46. Tyson v. Weatherly, 214 S.C. 336, 52 S.E.2d 410 (1949); Oliver v.
McWhirter, 112 S.C. 555, 100 S.E. 533 (1919).
47. 155 Me. 349, 155 A.2d 721 (1959).
48. 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307 (1920).
49. McCoRmicx, EVIDENCE 641 (West ed. 1954); Laughlin, In Support
of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195 (1955):
Professor Edmund M. Morgan gives seven reasons for the creation of
presumptions but these may be synthesized into the four given above.
1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS Or EVIDENCE 32 (1961).
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should shift where the presumption is based on procedural
convenience such as the presumption of the correctness of
official acts or the presumption of sanity. Here the opponent
of this presumption should have the burden of disproving it
(at least in civil cases) since to do otherwise would tend to
unnecessarily lengthen the trial.
On the other hand, presumptions based on the fairness in
allocating the production of evidence, for example, the pre-
sumption that the terminal carrier damaged goods that are
received in a damaged condition by the consignee, should in
an action involving several carriers act only to shift the bur-
den of producing evidence.
To further complicate things there is a class of presump-
tions based on social and economic policies that do more than
shift the normal burden of persuasion but which require that
the presumption in order to be overthrown must be disproved
by more than a mere preponderance of evidence. An example
of this is found in the South Carolina ease of Peoples Nat'l
Bank v. Manos.50 In this case the Court stated that where the
husband and wife were legally married at the time of the birth
of the child, there arose in favor of the child the presumption
of legitimacy, ". . . which though rebuttable, is one of the
strongest known to the law."51 Furthermore, "... the burden
of proof in such cases is upon the party impeaching the le-
gitimacy." The Court went on to say that in attempting to
establish illegitimacy, "Neither husband nor wife may testify
as to non-access between them in any case where the legiti-
macy of a child born in wedlock is at issue."
This theory of weighing the relative weight of presumptions
was adopted by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in the case
of O'Dea v. Amodeo'2 wherein Chief Justice Maltbie stated,
"No general rule can however, be laid down as to the effect
of a particular presumption in the actual trial of a case, for
this depends upon the purpose it is designed to serve."
While all courts tacitly acknowledge that presumptions
concerning legitimacy are to be given more weight than others,
50. 226 S.C. 257, 278, 84 S.E.2d 857 (1954).
51. An interesting case which points up the amount of evidence needed
to sustain the presumption of legitimacy is that of Russell v. Russell, 118
S.C. 420, 429, 110 S.E. 791 (1921). In that case the Court upheld the
presumption stating, "The facts and circumstances attending the living
together of James L. Russell and Eliza Russell were at least sufficient
to create a reasonable inference of presumption that they were lawfully
married, and that their children were born in lawful wedlock."
52. 118 Conn. 58, 170 Atl. 486 (1934).
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the theory as set forth in the O'Dea case has not been generally
followed. While the theory undoubtedly has merit it can be
seen that it would be extremely difficult for the trial judge
to attempt to determine the purpose for which each presump-
tion is created. This problem becomes more complicated where
the judge is faced with a presumption which is created for
two or more reasons. "1
South Carolina appears to have a split of authority in
that the burden of persuasion appears to have shifted in
cases involving the presumption of legitimacy5" and matters
concerning public policy54 and also in some of the suicide
cases55 while the Thayer rule is the prevailing rule in the
majority of cases.56 It should be pointed out that the reason for
the confusion inherent in the use of presumptions is that courts
of one jurisdiction adopt presumptions from other jurisdic-
tions where the presumption has a different procedural effect.
While this problem cannot be eliminated, it should be recog-
nized and some attempt should be made to deal uniformly
with presumptions within a particular jurisdiction. It is felt
that a clarification by the South Carolina Supreme Court of
its stand on presumptions would be most helpful.
53. Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Manos, 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E.2d 857 (1954);
Russell v. Russell, 118 S.C. 420, 110 S.E. 791 (1921).
54. Tyson v. Weatherly, 214 S.C. 336, 52 S.E.2d 410 (1949; Oliver v.
MeWhirter, 112 S.C. 555, 100 S.E. 533 (1919).
55. Strawhorne v. Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 40, 119 S.E.2d
101 (1961) ; McMillan v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 194 S.C. 146, 9 S.E.2d
562 (1940).
56. The Thayer theory has the virtue of uniformity and early won the
approval of the American Law Institute. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rules 703 and 704 (1942). However, the American Law Institute and the
American Bar Association rejected this theory in 1954 by adopting Rule
14 of the Uniform Rues of Evidence. Rule 14 draws a distinction between
presumptions based on probability and those where the presumption has
no probative value as evidence. The rule which so far remains virtually
untried (it does not appear that any state has adopted these rules although
tentative drafts have been submitted for adoption in New Jersey and Utah)
is as follows:
Rule 14. Effect of Presumptions.
Subject to Rule 16, and except for presumptions which are conclusive
or irrefutable under the rules of law from which they arise, (a) if the
facts from which the presumption is derived have any probative value
as evidence of the existence of the presumed fact, the presumption con-
tinues to exist and the burden of establishing the non-existence of the
presumed fact is upon the party against whom the presumption operates,
(b) if the facts from which the presumption arises have no probative
value as evidence of the presumed fact, the presumption does not exist
when evidence is introduced which would support a finding of the non-
existence of the presumed fact, and the fact which would otherwise be
presumed shall be determined from the evidence exactly as if no pre-
sumption was or had ever been involved. (Emphasis added)
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Charging the Jury
The ,final question dealt with in this note is how much,
if anything, should the trial judge tell the jury about presump-
tions. In the early South Carolina cases the judges merely
stated the presumption in their charge and left the application
of the presumption to the jury. Thus in the case of Pooler v.
Smith,57 the trial judge charged the jury as follows:
As to the legitimacy of a child, if you bring up that
question, it is simply a question of fact; but the law in
this State is, for the peace and repose of families, and
for the good of society, that a child, the issue of a man
and a woman lawfully married to each other, are pre-
sumed to be legitimate children and that presumption
prevails. It may, however, be rebutted, where you bring
positive proof to show that the child could not be the
lawful child of a man and his wife.
The defendant contended that this constituted a charge on
the facts and was in violation of the South Carolina Consti-
tution, Article 5, Section 26.58 The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision, holding that the charge stated a correct proposi-
tion of law.
While the origin of most presumptions are shrouded in
antiquity, they serve an extremely useful purpose in that they
allow the trial judge to state a legal opinion on a certain fact
grouping. This is important in many staites such as South
Carolina where the trial judge is forbidden by the Constitution
or by statutes from conveying his opinion either expressly or
impliedly on any question of fact at issue.59 Because of this
the judges have not hesitated to set forth the presumptions
in their charges even though at times it is not clear what
weight the jury is expected to give the presumption. 0 This
position may be criticized in that it implies too much or 'as
one jurist has complained the presumption amounts to 4 hint
from the court that they should find the presumed fact.61, It
57. 73 S.C. 102, 104, 52 S.E. 967 (1905).
58. S.C. CoNsT. art. 5 § 26 reads as follows, "Judges shall not charge
juries in respect to matters of fact, but shall declare the law."
59. State v. Simmons, 209 S.C. 531, 41 S.E.2d 217 (1947); Jackson v.
Jackson, 32 S.C. 591, 11 S.E. 204 (1890).
60. Gardner v. Kirven, 184 S.C. 37, 191 S.E. 814 (1936); Nimmer v.
Northwestern, 116 S.C. 190, 107 S.E. 479 (1921).
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appears that the current practice is for the trial judge to
state the presumption to the jury informing them that the
presumption is rebuttable by the evidence. This, coupled with
a charge on the burden of proof, appears to be sufficient. -2
However, one case has held that a failure to charge on the
burden of proof is not reversible error if no objection is inter-
posed.68
Another position, which was formerly popular in South
Carolina as elsewhere, was for the judge to instruct the jury
that the presumption is evidence and is to be weighed as such.
This position was adopted in the case of Joyner v. South Caro-
lina Ry. 64 and was implied in several later cases.65 As pointed
out earlier this position was overruled in the case of McMillan
v. General Am. Life Ins. Co.66
Another possibility would be for the trial judge to instruct
the jury that they should find in accordance with the presump-
tion unless they find that the opponent's evidence is of equal
weight and their minds are in equipoise, then they should find
against the party having the burden of persuasion. This
charge would be given in a jurisdiction following the Hinds
rule.67 It can be seen that this balancing of the probabilities
would be an extremely difficult task for any jury to perform.
Moreover it inevitably conveys the impression that the pre-
sumption must be weighed as evidence.
Two other possibilities remain. The first, advanced by
Professor Edmund M. Morgan is that the presumption acts to
shift the burden of persuasion in some cases and that the jury
should be instructed as to which party has this burden.6 8
Professor Morgan feels that the word presumption should only
be used in states such as California, where the trial judge is
required by statute to instruct the jury that the presumption
is evidence of.the presumed fact. Professor Morgan goes on
to say, "... its use (presumption) should be avoided wherever
possible, because it is likely to be misunderstood."
62. LIDE, JUDGE LiDE's Nomox 231-232.
63. Dubose v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 197 S.C. 1, 14 S.E.2d 349 (1941).
64. 26 S.C. 49, 1 S.E. 52 (1886).
65. McKendree v. Southern Life Ins. Co., 112 S.C. 335, 99 S.E. 806
(1919) ; Baker v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 S.C. 174, 69 S.E. 151 (1910) ;
Griffith & Bro. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 82 S.C. 252, 65 S.E. 222
(1908)., 
66. 194 S.C. 146, 9 S.E.2d 562 (1940).
67. 155 Me. 349, 155 A.2d 721 (1959).
68. 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 43 (1961).
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The error in this theory is that it leaves the jury up in the
air. They are told that one party has the burden of persuasion
but undoubtedly many jurors are aware of the general rule
that the plaintiff has the burden of proving his case. A state-
ment by the trial judge that the defendant has the burden
of persuasion on a particular issue may tend to mystify them.
Furthermore, telling the jury that one party has the burden of
persuasion without telling them why would be a suggestion
by the judge that they find a particular way. If the jury
were told that the burden of persuasion had shifted due to a
presumption, this could be understood, but a statement that
the burden had shifted with no explanation would convey the
impression that the judge had shifted the burden because of
some secret evidence that was available to him but unavailable
to them. Feeling that they were not in possession of all the
facts, or worse yet, that the judge had gleaned some important
fact from the testimony which they in their ignorance had
missed, the jurors would tend to vote against the person hav-
ing the burden of persuasion.
The last and most satisfactory possibility is the position
advanced by Professor Charles T. McCormick.69 This view
assumes that the presumption works by shifting the burden
of persuasion to the party against whom it operates of satis-
fying the jury that the presumed inference is untrue. Here
the trial judge would instruct that the presumption stands
until the jury is persuaded to the contrary. As stated by Pro-
fessor McCormick this instruction has the advantage in that
it makes sense. It does not require the jury to perform some
metaphysical feat of balancing the probabilities nor is it con-
fusing.
This theory was followed in South Carolina in some of the
early cases 7° before South Carolina became wedded to the
proposition that the burden of persuasion does not shift and
it is submitted that this earlier position should be re-examined
when the question is next presented to the Court.
COLDEN R. BATTEY, JR.
69. 13 WASH. L. REV. 185, 187-192 (1938).
70. Sullivan v. Charleston & W. C. Ry., 85 S.C. 532, 67 S.E. 905 (1910);
Hutto v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 81 S.C. 567, 62 S.E. 835 (1908); Joyner
v. South Carolina Ry., 26 S.C. 49, 1 S.E. 52 (1886).
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